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PAXARABICA?: PROVISIONAL SOVEREIGNTY AND
INTERVENTION IN THE ARAB UPRISINGS
ASLI BALI* AND Azmz RANA"
I. INTRODUCTION
Two moments of apparent symbolic victory punctuated 2011-a
year of uprisings and incipient revolution in the Arab world. The first
occurred when the deposed former-president of Egypt, Hosni
Mubarak, was wheeled on a hospital bed into a makeshift courtroom
for a trial in which he would be held accountable from behind the bars
of a cage. The second was captured in the video footage recorded by
cell phone of the final moments of Muammar Qaddafi's life. These
indelible images serve as markers of transition in Egypt and Libya
respectively, but the question of what they symbolize remains open.
In the Egyptian case, the sight of the former dictator physically
delivered to accountability in a court of law for his crimes might be
interpreted as a decisive break from the authoritarian past. But
equally the outsized focus on the former president, the makeshift
nature of the courtroom and trial, the limited scope of the discourse of
accountability, and the continuation of many other Mubarak-era
institutions (and actors in office) raise troubling questions about the
future trajectory of the transition. In the Libyan case, the sight of an
autocrat being laid low at the hands of the very people he long
oppressed might also be understood to reflect a clear break. On the
other hand, a turning of tables that ended in Qaddafi's summary
execution and the days-long display of his corpse might just as easily
be seen as continuing the prior regime's brutality and denial of rights.
The contrasting fates of Mubarak and Qaddafi reflect the challenges
faced by domestic actors now struggling to define the direction of the
transitions underway in Egypt and Libya. Each case also illustrates
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the degree to which transitional trajectories will continue to be
influenced and shaped by external actors, whether regional or
international.
From international and regional perspectives, as well as the
domestic perspectives of both transitioning countries, the Arab
uprisings represent an opportunity and a challenge. On the ground,
sustained popular protests have disrupted legacies of authoritarianism
and are slowly generating new structures of political authority.
Although these uprisings are very much the accomplishment of Arab
publics, regional and international players are nonetheless deeply
implicated in each of the countries undergoing transition. Confronted
with a rapidly accelerating dynamic that has the potential to alter
dramatically the existing security arrangements in the region and the
strategic balance on which they depend, actors from the Gulf
monarchies to Washington, Brussels, London, and Paris are asserting
their preferences in ways small and large. Unsurprisingly, events have
been received with ambivalence verging on alarm in such quarters.
From the counter-revolutionary forces assembled against transition in
Bahrain, Yemen, and Egypt to the aggressively interventionist posture
adopted towards Libya and Syria, it is difficult on first glance to
discern a coherent regional and international response to the
transitions of 2011.
For instance, many have commented on the allegedly inconsistent
approach of the Obama Administration, heralding the democratic
spirit of armed resistance groups in one setting while offering a muted
response to the dogged nonviolence of opposition groups elsewhere.
Beneath this alleged inconsistency, however, lies an underlying
coherence that is increasingly apparent. In fact, across the board the
American response has been designed to maintain its preferred
regional order, capitalizing on instability where it might unseat
adversaries and resisting forces of change where they target allies.
From a realpolitik perspective, there may be nothing surprising about
this posture. Why should the United States wish to see the same
treatment meted out to a long-term ally like Mubarak as to an
erstwhile foe like Qaddafi? In this sense, there is no contradiction in
the approaches taken to Egypt and Libya. In both Egypt and Libya,
popular uprisings may be instrumentalized to reinforce allies, overturn
adversaries, and secure a favorable regional balance. While we agree
that this description accurately captures the dynamics at work in the
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uprisings across the Arab world, we reject the "realist" justifications
offered for these regional and international orientations. In this paper,
we instead argue that these apparently "realist" strategies will prove
counter-productive in the long-run. If anything, the American posture
toward Arab publics-in which indigenous preferences must align
with external strategic objectives or face international reversal-is
ultimately destabilizing and likely to generate repeated cycles of
popular opposition and authoritarian violence.
Section two begins by exploring the underlying logic of the
American approach, which we argue is premised on a vision of Arab
political sovereignty as provisional and dependent on the state's
position in existing regional alliances. Indeed, we contend that this
provisional sovereignty is a wider feature of the current global order,
and speaks to pervasive substantive limitations on the capacity of
weak states to shape domestic decision-making.
Section three then turns to the practical effects of such provisional
sovereignty for Arab publics engaged in popular protest and
revolution. Our discussion focuses on five transitions (Egypt, Libya,
Yemen, Syria, and Bahrain) presently underway in the region and the
role of international actors in shaping political possibilities and
outcomes. In particular, we emphasize how-regardless of whether
the United States and its allies are promoting "orderly transition" or
more revolutionary overthrows-international actors are "intervening"
continuously throughout the region in ways that reinforce the
conditional nature of Arab self-determination.
Section four considers the resources available to Arab-publics and
democratic-civil-society movements to resist external pressures and to
reclaim a fuller conception of sovereignty. In the process, we develop
an argument in favor of a significant reordering of the Middle East
around indigenous preferences rather than international priorities
defended by local clients. Such a reordering would be in line with
emerging and locally-rooted democratic practices, and thus have the
long-term potential to generate a more stable and peaceful regional
dynamic, one not premised on a precarious balance of outside
interests. In effect, one reading of the Arab uprisings is as a
grassroots struggle to wrest control over domestic and regional
priorities away from an international geopolitical balance that supports
autocratic kleptocracies at the expense of representative politics. Part
of this struggle has included the recovery of vocabularies and
3232012]
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repertoires of transnational solidarity that reinforce rather than replace
local demands for autonomy and control. We conclude with
reflections on the emerging politics of transnational solidarity present
in the Arab uprisings, especially its potential to define a new,
grounded pax Arabica-one based neither on oil wealth nor
international prerogatives, but instead on the popular goals of
mobilized constituencies.
II. PERIPHERAL SOVEREIGNTIES AS PROVISIONAL SOVEREIGNTY?
In order to make sense of recent U.S. actions in the Middle East,
especially the seeming inconsistency of these actions, it is necessary
to take a step back and explore the international context within which
U.S. power operates. In the following pages, we argue that the
existing global order is marked decisively by a basic hierarchy
between core and peripheral states-particularly in the ability of weak
states to assert meaningful sovereignty over political and economic
decision-making. Moreover, this inequality goes hand-in-hand with
an increasingly entrenched presumption on the part of powerful global
actors that for weak states such sovereign control is granted only
provisionally, depending on the state-in-question's willingness to
support key international and regional arrangements. Core players
like the United States even claim a legitimate authority, often couched
in humanitarian terms, to reconstruct dependent and postcolonial
countries in the interests of external security objectives. Indeed, the
American response to the Arab uprisings (premised on local alliances
consistent with its strategic interests) speaks directly to these
developments and highlights both the peripheral and provisional
nature of sovereignty in the global south.
Since the collapse of direct colonial authority, international law
has presumed the formal equality of all nation-states (regardless of
previous imperial status). Such sovereign equality is founded on the
assumption that indigenous rather than external actors should shape a
state's domestic deliberation and policymaking. Yet today, for many
countries in the global south such formal legal equality is riddled with
substantive inequalities in the international distribution of wealth,
political authority, and military power. The result is that the capacity
of states to enjoy meaningful sovereignty is fundamentally determined
by whether those states are members of a core (largely coterminous
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with the global north) or periphery (overwhelmingly from the
postcolonial south).
For sovereignties in the periphery, practical economic and
political decision-making often does not reside with local citizens, but
instead lies in the nexus between international aid donors,
multinational investors (including oil and arms companies), Bretton
Woods institutions, and core states. Thus, despite the end of the
colonial period, through a plethora of carrots and sticks ranging from
economic conditionalities to outright military intervention, the great
powers continue to enjoy remarkable authority, albeit informally, over
how weaker states exercise internal self-rule. Commentator James
Tully notes that such informal authority generally operates "through
coalitions of various kinds and with various members at different
times (among the roughly G20) and through institutions of global
governance set up at the end of the World War II."' Along with the
Bretton Woods framework, this oversight can be seen in a series of
related institutions, including the Security Council of the United
Nations, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and its
military apparatus, the entrenchment of dependent elites in former
colonies, and the promotion of transnational trade regimes backed by
the power of the World Trade Organization (WTO).2 No doubt,
former colonies are participants in many of these institutions and their
elites have space to make claims and to exercise voice. Yet, such
voice is often dramatically curtailed by the very reliance of these elites
on core support for their continued rule.3
Standing behind all these overlapping institutions is the strength
of the American military and its assertion of a rightful international
police power. In effect, the over one thousand official and unofficial
American military bases stationed across the world provide the final
line of defense against any threat to the existing order. Indeed,
American military might serves as more than simply a global enforcer.
Through its police power, the United States tips the scales within local
disputes and protects friendly regimes by equipping and training
1. James Tully, Informal Imperialism and Res Publica: Imperialism and Anti-
imperialism in the Twenty-First Century 3 (Apr. 4, 2009) (paper delivered at
Columbia University).
2. Id. at 4.
3. See id; ANTONY ANGHIE, IMPERIALISM, SOVEREIGNTY AND THE MAKING OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW (2005).
2012] 325
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armed forces. These practices create relations of security dependence,
which often leave elites in the global south more reliant on American
security commitments than actual public support for preserving their
internal authority. Thus, U.S. global primacy is today deeply
intertwined with structures of international supervision, structures
which operate over the long-term to sustain the essential divide
between core and peripheral sovereignty.
Perhaps the most troubling aspect about current distributions of
authority is doubt over whether the international order's informal
mechanisms of external influence and direction have generated either
prosperity or lasting peace for peripheral sovereignties. More so than
ever before, the global community is marked by stark disparities in
opportunity between past imperial states and their historic colonies.
While half the world's population makes less than $2 a day and nearly
1 billion people are malnourished, the richest 1% owns wealth
equivalent to that of the poorest 57%.4 What makes these disparities
particularly noteworthy is that they have exploded just as those sites
of political responsibility connecting the global north and south have
increasingly dissolved. During the era of colonial dependency,
imperial states, for all their coerciveness, remained bound to colonized
peoples by relations of actual governance. Indeed, simply to maintain
order over unruly indigenous communities, European empires had to
be at least partially responsive to local expectations. By contrast, the
current moment is marked not by explicit relations of control but
rather by a diffusion of practical authority, spread across a variety of
shifting sites, ultimately reinforced by American police power. Thus,
although meaningful authority may be exercised at the international
level, local publics often have limited means by which to intervene or
to establish clear lines of accountability.
The youth activists who sparked the protests in Tunisia and Egypt
responded to what may have been an inchoate sense of this
disempowerment by taking to the streets and calling into question the
domestic arrangements of political authority that undermine both
accountability and agency. The central constituency of protesters
across the region has included those who are marginalized politically
and economically by regimes that are sustained by a "neocolonial"
4. JEREMY SEABROOK, THE NO-NONSENSE GUIDE TO WORLD POVERTY 24 tbl.
(2003).
HeinOnline  -- 42 Cal. W. Int'l L.J. 326 2011-2012
PAX ARABICA?
Arab order. Their demands have articulated in the simplest possible
terms a desire to set policy priorities and hold power accountable to
their own interests. Freedom, dignity, and economic justice have been
the banners under which the protests are organized from Tunis to
Sanaa to Manama to Damascus. Of all the commonalities across the
region, the one that characterizes each of the domestic contexts most
clearly is the deep gap between the rulers and the ruled. The various
grievances of Arab publics-economic, social, cultural, and
international-have converged on the need for fundamental political
reform that would enable mass publics to reclaim the capacity to
express indigenous preferences and to intervene in local politics.
Thus, discontent with existing regimes is related not only to their
international impotence but also their complicity in an order widely
recognized as being unresponsive to the rights of the average citizen.
At base, citizens across the region understand that when they lack
jobs, are beaten by the police, and ruled by unaccountable corrupt
cliques subservient to an international order, change will only come
through reversing their own disenfranchisement. Yet the reality of
being at the periphery has meant that despite the common demands
that unite Arab publics, some are empowered by the international
context and others encounter more or less subtle forms of counter-
revolutionary pressure.
The American response to protests across the Middle East
underscores the differential treatment of common popular demands
and, in the process, a key characteristic of peripheral sovereignty. It
speaks to the extent to which sovereignty for weaker and postcolonial
states is implicitly presumed to be conditional and dependent rather
than permanent and unquestioned. In other words, states are free from
the prospect of regime change, or policies aimed at subverting existing
political elites, so long as those states are reliable allies of core powers
and thus committed to maintaining regional arrangements. But for
countries pegged as strategic opponents, U.S. and E.U. practices
suggest very different consequences. In these states, internal conflicts
offer a clear opportunity for Western policymakers to entrench local
actors more responsive to external interests and objectives. Indeed,
the primary indicator of whether regimes facing internal rebellion
were confronted by an American or European policy of overthrow or
one of stabilization had little to do with the relative brutality of elites
on the ground.
2012] 327
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This fact is underscored by the shifts in argumentative rhetoric
deployed by senior U.S. officials when speaking about "rogue" states
such as Libya or Syria in contrast to established allies like Egypt. In
the former case, the rhetoric has consistently emphasized dictatorial
violence and the legitimacy of external projects of regime change.
President Obama, in his May 2011 Middle East speech, went so far as
to condemn Qaddafi as "[t]he most extreme example" of how "leaders
have turned to repression to remain in power." But in the latter case,
officials have been much more respectful discursively of the sovereign
right of domestic leaders to shape the nature of transition processes.
Indeed, Vice President Biden's immediate response to the protests in
Egypt was to reject any connection between popular opposition in
Tunisia and in Egypt, and to state emphatically that Mubarak
remained a valued ally: "Mubarak has been an ally of ours in a
number of things and he's been very responsible on ... geopolitical
interests in the region: Middle East peace efforts, the actions Egypt
has taken relative to normalizing the relationship with Israel." 6 All
this meant that Biden "would not refer to him as a dictator" and
believed that it was not the United States' role to impose outcomes on
Mubarak, although he "hope[d] Mubarak ... [would] respond to some
of the legitimate concerns." In effect, Biden implicitly and
unintentionally suggested how one's location in geostrategic alliances
was central to the enjoyment by states in the global south of thick and
substantive sovereign control.
In order to tease out the practical consequences for local actors on
the ground of this larger structure of provisional sovereignty, we turn
in the next section to a closer analysis of conditions in Egypt, Bahrain,
Yemen, Syria, and Libya-focusing especially on how international
influences have generated differential domestic political paths. As
these cases highlight, the competing discursive strategies pursued by
the Obama Administration have had far more than a purely symbolic
effect. These strategies are bound to policy orientations that have
5. President Barack Obama, Mideast Speech (May 19, 2011), in N.Y. TIMES
(May 19, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/20/world/middleeast/20prexy-
text.html?r-1.
6. Interview by Jim Lehrer with Vice President Joseph Biden (Jan. 27, 2011),
available at http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/politics/jan-junel l/biden_01-27.html.
7. Id.
8. Id.
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significantly altered the direction of indigenous protests. If anything,
the response by the United States-as well as its allies, from the Gulf
Cooperation Council (GCC) and the Arab League to the European
Union-highlights how external actors are "intervening" in every
context across the region, in ways that are recognized as
interventionist in some circumstances but go unnoticed in others.
III. THROUGH A GLASS DARKLY: ARAB UPRISINGS INTERRUPTED
Two competing strategies have been deployed in international
responses to the Arab uprisings. The first has been an emphasis on the
importance of order and nonviolence in the course of managed
transitions. This approach suggests that democratic transition is a
long-term process in which institutional prerequisites must be met,
constitutional provisions respected, technocratic management prized,
and public demands quelled. In short, mobilized publics cannot be
trusted to engage in political transformation, but must be subjected to
specific constraints to keep them on an externally-approved
transitional path. An emphasis on order, stability, and nonviolence is
deemed paramount to the legitimacy of the transition in this paradigm.
By contrast, the second approach is far more radical, demanding an
unconditional and decisive break from the prior regime immediately
and, where necessary, by force of arms.
Unsurprisingly, the first approach is applied to those countries
deemed to be members of the Middle Eastern "axis of moderation,"
that is, countries that have supported a regional balance premised on
pax Americana.9 Equally straightforward, the second approach has
been applied to countries that are peripheral to or are believed to
actively resist this balance, such as Libya and Syria. The United
States is not the only, or in some instances even the preeminent, actor
9. The definition of "moderation" here is support for specific U.S. (and, to a
lesser extent, European) regional policy priorities, including Israeli security, access
to energy resources, cooperation in "war on terror" policies, and containment of
Iran. The Arab countries that have been most supportive of a regional balance
premised on these priorities-a regional pax Americana-are Egypt, Jordan,
Yemen, and the GCC (plus post-occupation Iraq, which is in its own separate
category as an American dependency). For a detailed argument concerning the
relationship between pax Americana in the Arab world and the so-called "axis of
moderation," see Ash Bali & Aziz Rana, American Overreach: Strategic Interests
and Millennial Ambitions in the Middle East, 15 GEOPOLITICs 210, 224-30 (2010).
2012] 329
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in determining which approach applies where. The balance in
question is one that was put in place by the United States and
continues to be secured by its presence as a regional hegemon
(through its military and economic assets in the Middle East). But
many actors are invested in the balance, particularly regional actors
like the GCC, and in some instances also have other goals that are
consistent with but not reliant on American preferences-as with the
European Union's immigration and energy interests in Libya.
The international and regional actors we consider herein are
pursuing strategies of regime change or counter-revolution in support
of stabilizing and reinforcing an order underwritten by the United
States, but they are not necessarily acting at the behest of U.S.
policymakers. Rather, a more complex relationship exists between
multiple players acting in coordination and seeking to transform the
very real challenge posed by the Arab uprisings into an opportunity to
deepen their preferred regional balance. Just as this broader strategy
is intended to reinforce a particular version of pax Americana, so the
indigenous preferences that have given rise to the Arab uprisings hold
the promise of a new ordering principle for the region, a pax Arabica
that by virtue of being grounded in local legitimacy may in the long-
run prove more stable. To evaluate this possibility, we canvass the
deployment of the two strategies-orderly transition versus regime
change-and the role they have played in shaping outcomes over the
course of the last year.
A. Orderly Transition
The logic of "orderly transition" as a mechanism for managing
and containing public protest first emerged in Egypt. As soon as the
Egyptian protests began, the Mubarak regime's traditional Western
and regional allies-with the Obama Administration in the lead,
coordinating with European partners, Israel, and the Gulf Arab
states-began a balancing act designed to contain the transformative
potential of the uprising without appearing to be on the "wrong side of
history." Initially, this balancing act generated a policy in evident
disarray. In a three week period, American officials went from
describing the Mubarak regime as stable,'0 to rejecting popular
10. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton assessed the Egyptian government as
"stable and . . . looking for ways to respond to the legitimate needs and interests of
HeinOnline  -- 42 Cal. W. Int'l L.J. 330 2011-2012
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characterizations of Mubarak as a dictator," to calling for reform
overseen by Mubarak, 12 to insisting on dialog between the regime and
opposition,' 3 to evoking the necessity of an "orderly transition,"1 4 to
suggesting the transition should be presided over by Mubarak
personally or his designated successor,15 to celebrating the triumph of
the Egyptian people" in contrast to Tunisia. US Urges Restraint in Egypt, Says
Government Stable, REUTERS (Jan. 25 2011), http://af.reuters.com/article/top
News/idAFJOE7000KF20110125.
11. Vice President Joe Biden categorically rejected that description during a
television interview with Jim Lehrer. Interview by Jim Lehrer with Vice President
Joseph Biden, supra note 6.
12. Secretary of State Clinton described the protests as "an important
opportunity .. . to implement political, economic, and social reforms to respond to
the legitimate needs and interests of the Egyptian people." Hillary Rodham Clinton,
Sec'y of State, Remarks with Jordanian Foreign Minister Nasser Judeh After their
Meeting (Jan. 26, 2011), available at http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2011
/01/155388.htm.
13. In a presidential address, Obama called for "meaningful dialogue between
the government and its citizens" as the only way forward in Egypt. President
Barack Obama, Remarks by the President on the Situation in Egypt (Jan. 28, 2011),
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/01/28/remarks-
president-situation-egypt.
14. At the end of January, Secretary of State Clinton first articulated the
administration's view that the Mubarak regime would have to "take steps that will
result in a peaceful, orderly transition to a democratic regime." Interview by David
Gregory with Sec'y of State Hillary Rodham Clinton (Jan. 30, 2011), available at
http://m.state.gov/mdl55585.htm. President Obama followed up on February 1,
2011, by saying "an orderly transition must be meaningful, it must be peaceful, and
it must begin now." President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President on the
Situation in Egypt (Feb. 1, 2011), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-
press-office/2011/01/28/remarks-president-situation-egypt.
15. First, former ambassador Frank Wisner was sent by the Obama
Administration to consult with Mubarak about the transition. Following his
meetings with Mubarak, Wisner told a gathering of the Middle East Quartet at the
Munich Security Conference that "Mubarak must stay" to preside over the
transition. Adrian Oroz, Transformation in Egypt: With or Without Mubarak?-
Middle East Quartet Meets in Munich, MUNICH SECURITY CONF. (Feb. 6, 2011),
http://www.securityconference.de/Program.638+M5c6761a38ce.0.html. Later, Vice
President Biden clarified that the Mubarak official who should take responsibility
for presiding over "orderly transition" was Omar Suleiman, Mubarak's long-time
head of intelligence services who had been appointed to the long-vacant Vice
Presidency by Mubarak on January 29, 2011, after being designated heir apparent by
external Mubarak regime allies. Biden Presses Egypt's Suleiman for Orderly
Transition, AL-ARABIYA (Feb. 8, 2011), http://www.alarabiya.net/articles
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the protest movement,16 while insisting on a caretaker government
presided over by Mubarak-era military and intelligence chiefs.17 The
vagaries of this policy highlighted the difficulty of seeking to stabilize
a longstanding ally (a priority shared particularly by Israel and the
Gulf Arab states) without further undermining U.S. credibility in the
eyes of protesters.
It should be noted that all the zigzagging of American positions
had little immediate impact on the course of events in Tahrir Square.
However, though Western powers and regional powerbrokers were
peripheral to the initial trajectory of public revolt, over time they
became crucial to the transformation of the post-Mubarak context
from uprising to soft military coup. The "orderly transition" that
ensued under Mubarak's defense minister-Field Marshall
Mohammed Hussein Tantawi, head of the governing Supreme Council
of the Armed Forces (SCAF)-began with constitutional amendments
that left the Mubarak constitution largely in place. Further, SCAF
sequenced parliamentary elections ahead of new presidential elections
(that would replace military rule with a civilian executive) and the
drafting of a new constitution.' 8 Such "orderly transition" eventually
/2011/02/08/136857.html. A 2006 diplomatic cable released by Wikileaks
illustrates the centrality of Suleiman's role as Egypt's envoy to Western allies and
Israel. The cable suggested that Suleiman enjoyed a strong relationship with the
CIA and that '[o]ur intelligence collaboration with Omar Suleiman is now probably
the most successful element of the relationship' with Egypt." He was also described
as Mubarak's "consigliere" on foreign policy. Gregory Viscusi & Thomas Penny,
Mubarak's Top Spy Suleiman Rejected by Cairo Streets as Protesters March,
BLOOMBERG (Feb. 1, 2011), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-02-
01/mubarak-s-top-spy-suleiman-rejected-by-cairo-streets-as-protesters-march.html
(quoting cables released by Wikileaks).
16. On February 11, 2011, the day that Mubarak resigned, President Obama
stated that "[t]he people of Egypt have spoken, their voices have been heard, and
Egypt will never be the same." President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President
on Egypt (Feb. 11, 2011), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011
/02/11/remarks-president- egypt.
17. When the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) stepped in as a
transitional government, the popular revolt gave way to a soft military coup with the
support of the United States, the European Union, and the Gulf Arab states. Matt
Spetalnick, Obama Urges Egyptian Army to Ensure Democratic Change, REUTERS
(Feb. 11, 2011), http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/02/11/us-egypt-usa-idUSTRE
71175920110211.
18. David D. Kirkpatrick, Egypt's Military Expands Power, Raising Alarms,
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produced a power grab by the military, which sought to retain full
control of the Egyptian government until presidential elections-
elections that would be deferred to 2013 or later.19 With such
expanded powers, the military had hoped to preside over the
constitutional process, enabling SCAF to introduce amendments that
offered the military "immunity from prosecution in civilian courts,
protection from oversight of their operations and budget, and a writ to
intervene in political affairs in the name of protecting the secular
character of the government." 20  This effort to consolidate the
military's control of the transitional process has been forestalled, at
present, by the "second Egyptian revolution," marked by fresh
uprisings in Tahrir Square in late November 2011.21 Although these
uprisings were first met with renewed repression, they eventually
generated concessions regarding the timetable for transition to civilian
rule.22 Still, it is far too soon to celebrate civilianization, given that
any transfer from military authority remains deferred to late 2012.23
Such developments underscore how the forces of counter-
revolution are in evidence at multiple levels in post-Mubarak Egypt.
For instance, while the chaotic trials of Mubarak and his senior
lieutenants have proceeded in fits and starts before hastily arranged
civilian courts, 12,000 Egyptian civilians have faced criminal
sentencing in military trials for charges related to criticizing the
SCAF.24 As ordinary Egyptians have become disenchanted with
transitional justice-based on the perceived insincerity of the trials of
Mubarak regime officials, the absence of procedural protections for
civilians tried in military courts, and the cosmetic nature of the
N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 14, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/15/world/
middleeast/egypts-military-expands-power-raising-alarms.html.
19. Id.
20. Id. Egyptian state elites and their allies in the beltway, Tel Aviv and the
GCC, prefer this model of an unaccountable military guardian entrenched through
constitutional protections; it is their interpretation of the "Turkish model."
21. Ashraf Khalil, The Second Republic of Tahrir, FOREIGN POL'Y (Nov. 22,
2011), http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/11/22/tahrir-square scaf _pro
tests.
22. Id.
23. Wendell Steavenson, Back to the Square, NEW YORKER (Dec. 12, 2011),
http://www.newyorker.com/talk/comment/2011/12/12/111212taco-talk-steavenson.
24. Khalil, supra note 21.
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reforms of the notorious Interior Ministry, among other things-the
transition itself has been presided over by generals that have arrested
the leaders of the Tahrir uprising. Those arrested include prominent
activists and bloggers, like Alaa Abdel Fatah and Asmaa Mahfouz,
who led the original uprising. Moreover, governing generals have
also moved to protect the military's economic interests and the
Ministry of Defense's conception of stability, keeping Mubarak-era
institutions in place.25
Thus, the transfer of power following the ouster of Mubarak did
not dismantle the regime he presided over; it was a decapitation
followed by a military takeover. While the forces that overthrew
Mubarak were entirely indigenous, the aftermath has depended in part
on the relationship between Egyptian generals and their external
supporters. Among the first acts of the SCAF was a declaration that
Egypt would remain "committed to all regional and international
obligations and treaties," a commitment widely interpreted as
insulating the Egypt-Israel peace treaty from democratic reversal.26
Because the SCAF is seen internationally as the only reliable
mechanism to maintain Egyptian-Israeli relations, it has been able to
expand Emergency Law powers and avoid transfer of power to a
legitimate civilian government, inhibiting the initial democratizing
potential of the uprisings. 27
If counter-revolution has taken stealth hold of the Egyptian
transition, it has been far more brazen in other contexts. The most
notorious such case has been Bahrain, where nonviolent
demonstrations calling for democratizing reforms were met with
brutal repression and then direct military intervention against unarmed
protesters. The peaceful mass protests of February and March 2011
gave way to spasms of regime violence, bolstered by GCC armies,
yielding scores of dead demonstrators and bystanders, widespread
allegations of torture, introduction of emergency laws, lengthy jail
terms (including for medical doctors who treated wounded protesters),
25. Steven A. Cook, Revolution 2.0, FOREIGN POL'Y (Nov. 22, 2011),
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/11/21/egyptclashestahrir-scaf.
26. Army Council: Egypt Is Committed to All Treaties, EGYPT ST. INFO.
SERVICE (Feb. 13, 2011), http://www.sis.gov.eg/En/Story.aspx?sid=53702.
27. Marc Lynch, Don't Let the Israeli Embassy Disaster Kill Egyptian
Democracy, FOREIGN POL'Y (Sept. 10, 2011), http://lynch.Foreignpolicy
com/posts/2011/09/10/theisraeli-embassydisaster.
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and the demolition of shiite mosques producing further sectarian
polarization in the majority shi'i island governed by a sunni
monarchy. 28 The regime's decision to militarize its response to the
uprisings, 29 backed by Saudi Arabia and the GCC, and the subsequent
armed suppression of peaceful protests was met with near-universal
silence on the part of the principal Western allies of Bahrain. The
United States has significant assets in Bahrain, where its Fifth Fleet is
based, and so as with events in Egypt, beltway policymakers
perceived the anti-regime uprisings as a threat to their interests in the
region.
The United States set the tone for a Western response that was
muted in the extreme, mildly criticizing the regime's human rights
abuses while equivocally calling for "both sides" to refrain from
violence in the absence of evidence that the violence was anything but
unilateral regime repression of peaceful protesters. For instance, U.S.
acknowledgment of Bahraini fears of Iranian influence legitimized the
recharacterization of the uprising in terms of national security rather
than political reform. Against a record of excessive force by the
regime, State Department officials sat by silently as Saudi troops
rolled into Manama.30  Moreover, in the administration's most
28. Bahrain: An Unfolding Human Rights Crisis, HUM. RTS. WATCH (July 5,
2011), http://www.hrw.org/news/2011/07/05/bahrain-unfolding-human-rights-crisis;
INT'L CRISIS GRP., MIDDLE EAST/NORTH AFRICA REPORT No. 111 POPULAR
PROTEST IN NORTH AFRICA AND THE MIDDLE EAST (VIII): BAHRAIN'S ROCKY ROAD
TO REFORM, at i (2011), available at http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/middle-
east-north-africa/iraq-iran-gulf/bahrain/ 111-popular-protest-in-north-africa-and-the-
middle-east-viii-bahrains-rocky-road-to-reform.aspx (follow "Full PDF Report"
hyperlink).
29. The protests in Bahrain began three days after the ouster of Mubarak, on
February 14, 2011. By mid-March, hardliners in the al-Khalifa family-the sunni
monarchy of Bahrain-invited GCC troops into the country to help put down the
protests. To add to the sectarian tensions produced by the confrontation between the
monarchy and mobilized peaceful Bahraini opposition groups, the regime also
invoked the specter of an Iranian anti-monarchy conspiracy. GCC troops entered
Bahrain on March 14, 2011, three days before the UN Security Council
greenlighted, with GCC support, a military intervention in Libya. The difference, of
course, was that the GCC military intervention in Bahrain was against unarmed
protesters, while elsewhere in Libya the GCC favored military intervention on
behalf of an armed insurgency against the sitting government. For more on the GCC
mobilization in Bahrain, see INT'L CRISIS GRP., supra note 28.
30. It was widely rumored among Bahraini activists that Assistant Secretary of
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detailed statement about the violence in Bahrain, President Obama
cited Bahraini interests in "law and order" as a legitimate constraint
on popular protests. In that May speech, the President said that:
Bahrain is a longstanding partner, and we are committed to its
security. We recognize that Iran has tried to take advantage of the
turmoil there, and that the Bahraini government has a legitimate
interest in the rule of law. . .. The only way forward is for the
government and opposition to engage in a dialogue .... The
government must create the conditions for dialogue, and the
opposition must participate to forge a just future for all Bahrainis.31
Some six months after this speech, the Bahrain Independent
Commission of Inquiry issued its report concluding that "the Bahraini
authorities had used torture and excessive force during its crackdown
on pro-democracy protesters," and criticizing official illegality,
abductions of civil society activists, use of security courts to try
civilians, and failures of accountability. 32 The Commission, headed
by the well-respected international jurist Cherif Bassiouni, concluded
that there was no evidence of Iranian involvement in the uprisings. 33
The report resulted in another round of muted responses by regional
and Western actors and occasioned no change on the ground in
Bahrain. At present, hundreds of political detainees remain jailed
following military trials, and the sectarian character of the crackdown
continues to poison any possibility of reconciliation or reform.
A third example of counter-revolution in the guise of "orderly
transition" is evident in the case of Yemen. Here again, eleven
months of popular protests have been met with periodic outbursts of
regime violence while Western and regional (largely Gulf Arab)
actors have moved systematically to reinforce the position of the Saleh
regime against its domestic opponents, privileging order and stability
State Jeffrey Feltman was in Manama when the Saudi troops arrived on March 14,
2011.
31. President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President on the Middle East
and North Africa (May 19, 2011), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-
press-office/2011/05/19/remarks-president-middle-east-and-north-africa.
32. Kristian Coates Ulrichsen, Bahrain's Uncertain Future, FOREIGN POL'Y
(Nov. 23, 2011), http://mideast.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2011/11/23/bahrain
suncertain future.
33. Id.
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over meaningful engagement with protesters' demands. Persistent
street protests since January have failed to oust President Ali Abdullah
Saleh, but following an incident in Sana'a in which Saleh's forces shot
and killed dozens of unarmed demonstrators, 34 mass regime defections
transformed the uprisings into a near-civil war. As violence escalated
in Yemen, the regional and external response was to step in through
diplomatic efforts spearheaded by the GCC to broker "peaceful
transition." The emphasis on Saleh's participation in a negotiated exit
was roundly rejected by activists who repudiated transitional
compromises premised on immunity for Saleh and his family. The
skepticism of protesters was reinforced as Saleh agreed on three
separate occasions to step down, transferring power to his chosen
deputy-Vice President Abd al-Rab Mansur al-Hadi-only to go back
on the agreements. 35  The most recent iteration of this model of
immunity-for-transition was put in place in November 2011 when
Saleh resigned, accepting an offer of immunity, and legally transferred
the presidency to his deputy.
Yet even as a new "national unity" cabinet (presided over by Vice
President al-Hadi) met, Yemeni civil society activist Tawakul Karman
argued in her Nobel Prize acceptance speech that Saleh remained
functionally in power and was pushing the country into renewed civil
war.36  As demonstrations persist across, Yemen, rejecting Saleh's
impunity as well as the so-called transition represented by the
assumption of power by his surrogate, the United States continues to
view the Yemeni uprisings "through the lens of counterterrorism"-
taking its cues from Saleh and his Saudi allies.37 While the United
States may consider Saleh an ally against Al-Qaeda in the Arabian
Peninsula, in effect it has been the U.S.-Saudi strategy of regime
34. It is worth noting that this massacre in Sana'a occurred on March 18, 2011,
one day after military intervention was authorized against the Libyan regime for
comparable attacks on armed protesters.
35. See Yemen President Ali Abdullah Saleh Defiant over Exit, BBC (Apr. 24,
2011), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-13181324.
36. Mohammed Ghobari & Gwladys Fouche, New Yemen Cabinet Meets;
Nobel Winner Says Saleh Wants War, REUTERS (Dec. 11, 2011),
http://af.reuters.com/article/worldNews/idAFTRE7B907720111210.
37. Stacey Philbrick Yadav, Opposition to Yemen's Opposition, FOREIGN
POL'Y (July 14, 2011), http://mideast.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2011/07/14/
opposition tojemen sopposition.
3372012]
HeinOnline  -- 42 Cal. W. Int'l L.J. 337 2011-2012
338 CALIFORNIA WESTERN INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 42
maintenance in Yemen that has been the enabler of unrest and rising
Salafism in Yemen's tribal regions." Meanwhile, the persistent calls
for political reform emanating from Yemeni civil society are stifled
under the rubric of managed transition.
B. Intervention and Regime Change
Standing in direct contrast to the insistence on orderly transition
and the stabilization strategies deployed in Egypt, Bahrain, and
Yemen, the second approach to the Arab uprisings has been direct
intervention by external actors in favor of regime change. This
strategy has been reserved for those regimes in the region that are
perceived as adversaries of pax Americana. If Egypt was the
incubator for the strategy of orderly transition, the anti-regime
intervention model was first openly adopted in the Libyan case. Here,
the convergence of a number of key factors-all driven by
international and regional actors-facilitated the first ever
internationally-sanctioned militarized "humanitarian" intervention
under the doctrine of responsibility to protect (R2P). The underlying
external factors enabling this approach included the GCC's decision to
intervene in Bahrain, a strategy that was accepted by Western powers
in a quid pro quo for intervention in Libya. Other enabling factors
consisted of the European Union's interest in containing refugee flows
from North Africa and maintaining privileged access to Libyan energy
resources, and the broader Western interest in appearing to support
indigenous demands for political transformation in the least costly
Arab context. Taken together, these factors (and U.S. willingness to
mobilize in favor of revolution in Libya following widely criticized
policies on Egypt and Bahrain) generated the political will for a
Security Council-sanctioned intervention against Libya.
In the case of Libya, coercive measures were the first rather than
the last option employed by the Security Council, contrary to the
formal requirements of the R2P doctrine. 39 The protests in Libya
38. See Jeb Boone, Time to Freeze Saleh's Assets, FOREIGN POL'Y (Nov. 10,
2011), http://mideast.foreignpolicy.com/posts/201 1/1 1/10/time to freeze saleh
s assets.
39. For a comprehensive examination of the doctrine's requirements, see INT'L
COMM'N ON INTERVENTION AND STATE SOVEREIGNTY, THE RESPONSIBLITY TO
PROTECT (2001), available at http://responsibilitytoprotect.org/
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began on February 15, 2011. The Qaddafi regime responded with
violence within the first few days, much as had been the case in
Egypt, Bahrain, and Yemen. Unlike those cases, however, the
Council moved precipitously to address the Libyan situation. Within
one week of the first protests, on February 22, 2011, the Council
issued a press statement expressing its concern. Within four days of
that statement, the Council adopted its first package of coercive
measures in Resolution 1970-an asset freeze, arms embargo, travel
ban, and referral of the regime to the International Criminal Court-
without attempting any diplomatic overture to the Libyan authorities.
Further, by threatening the regime with criminal indictment, this first
concrete action seemed more likely to foreclose than encourage a
negotiated solution to the crisis. Less than three weeks after that
sanctions package was passed, the Security Council passed Resolution
1973 with an open-ended authorization to use force.
Once the NATO intervention began, the toll on the civilian
population steadily increased. As the tactic of aerial bombardment
failed to achieve immediate results, NATO's definition of its mission
expanded, exceeding anything authorized by the Security Council.40
First, NATO began attacking not only regime forces threatening
civilian populations, but also Libyan troops in retreat. Next, they
targeted Libyan forces wherever they may be, even when not involved
in any threat to civilians, but stationed far from conflict in the western
provinces. As these tactics failed to alter decisively the military
balance, NATO resorted to increased airstrikes in Tripoli. These
attacks soon took on the appearance of assassination attempts. Tripoli
finally fell in brutal fighting followed by widespread reprisal attacks
by rebel forces against villages and towns that they deemed overly-
loyal to regime forces.4 ' At the close of the six-month NATO
ICISS%20Report.pdf.
40. This expanded mission was bitterly criticized by Russia and China, who
had reluctantly acquiesced in Resolution 1973 on the basis of its allegedly limited
mandate. Their opposition to the scope of the NATO intervention later became a
basis for resisting coercive resolutions by the Council against Syria.
41. Tarik Kafala, 'Cleansed' Libyan Town Spills Its Terrible Secrets, BBC
(Dec. 12, 2011), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/magazine-16051349 (noting that
30,000 people had been driven from their homes in Tawergha by rebels who were
acting in "revenge" for the siege of Misrata, which had been conducted partially by
troops based in Tawergha). "Human rights groups have described this as an act of
revenge and collective punishment possibly amounting to a crime against humanity.
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intervention, the civilian death toll in Libya (according to the
Transitional National Council's Health Minister) stood at over
30,000,42 some twentyfold greater than the death toll in the first month
of the uprising, prior to the intervention. With the NATO-assisted
capture of Qaddafi followed by his execution at the hands of Misratan
rebels, the "humanitarian" mandate ended, but the presence of
international and regional (particularly Qatari) interests in the Libyan
"transition" remained in place. Indeed, we can see this continuing
involvement in current battles over the state of Libya's sovereign
assets, which foreign powers froze under Security Council mandate.
Even today, foreign actors continue to resist returning those funds to
the post-transition Libyan government, highlighting the degree of
economic coercion that marked intervention.4 3 All in all, there has
been a stark contrast between Libya-where an anti-regime uprising
enjoyed international support despite resorting to armed insurgency-
and the countries in which unarmed protesters faced internationally
sanctioned counter-revolution, including Egypt, Bahrain, and Yemen.
Despite fundamental differences between Libya and Syria-not
least the fact of the latter's geopolitical location, sharing borders with
Iraq, Israel, and Turkey, as well as Jordan and Lebanon-the Syrian
case has taken a somewhat similar trajectory. This, in large part, is a
result of the one significant dimension along which the two states
resemble one another: they are both perceived as outside of the set of
alliances that mark Middle Eastern pax Americana. As a consequence
particularly of its relationship with Iran and its belligerent posture
Tawerghans are mostly descendants of black slaves." Id.
42. Naji Barakat, the interim health minister of the transitional government,
offered this estimate (together with 50,000 wounded). Christine Dugay, The Help
Needed in the New Libya, DEVEX.COM (Sept. 19, 2011),
http://www.devex.com/en/articles/from-humanitarian-intervention-to-assistance-the-
issue-of-reconstruction.
43. In remarks at a conference in February 2012, Cherif Bassiouni noted that
in negotiations with the TNC, the Italian government agreed to release no more than
20% of Libya's frozen sovereign assets, requiring that the new government receive
the remaining 80% through in-kind purchases of Italian goods and services. Cherif
Bassiouni, Keynote Address at UCLA Journal of International Law and Foreign
Affairs Symposium, February 17, 2012. For an earlier account of wrangling to
release Libyan funds, see Sophie Quinton, The Quest for Libya's Frozen Assets,
ATLANTIC (Aug. 26, 2011), http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/
2011/08/the-quest-for-libyas-frozen-assets/244171/.
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towards Israel, the Syrian regime does not enjoy access to the same
key sources of support that were available to Egypt, Bahrain, or even
Yemen in their confrontations with domestic opponents. Once Qatar,
Damascus's erstwhile ally in the GCC, made the strategic decision to
cut ties with the Assad regime (in the midst of Qatar's direct
participation as the sole Arab army involved in military action against
Libya),4 Syria was easily isolated by other regional actors.45 Deemed
a member of the "axis of resistance" by the United States-which
groups Syria together with Iran, Hizbollah, and Hamas-Syria has
been targeted for regime change, a goal of American policymakers
long before the Arab uprisings of 201 1.46 With the advent of popular
protests in Syria4 7-erupting after mass mobilization in Daraa on
March 17, 201 1-international steps to isolate Damascus were
undertaken, albeit cautiously for fear of destabilizing the Israel-Syria
border.
Again, the focal points for the international response to Syria were
the GCC, the League of Arab States, and the United Nations Security
Council. As early as April 2011, even as the Libyan conflict
escalated, the United States and its E.U. partners were circulating a
draft Security Council press statement demanding an end to the Syrian
regime's crackdown. 48 While these initial efforts failed, the Council
44. Anthony Shadid, Qatar Wields an Outside Influence in Arab Politics, N.Y.
TIMES (Nov. 14, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/15/world/middleeast/
qatar-presses-decisive-shift-in-arab-politics.html.
45. There is also a sectarian dimension to Syria's isolation-something that
was not present in the Libyan case. Because the Assad regime is a minority alawite
regime presiding over a majority sunni population, the willingness of both GCC
countries and Turkey to step in to offer support and protection to a largely sunni
uprising, with assistance from sunni communities in Iraq and Lebanon, has been
notable.
46. General Wesley Clark recently revealed that he had been shown a list of
seven countries to be targeted for regime change by the United States following the
September 11th attacks. These countries were: Iraq, Syria, Libya, Lebanon, Sudan,
Somalia, and Iran. Of these countries, only Iran has not experienced some form of
regime change in the last decade. Glenn Greenwald, Wes Clark and the Neocon
Dream, SALON.COM (Nov. 26, 2011), http://politics.salon.com/2011/11/26/
wes clark and the neocon dream/.
47. Once again, the timing of the Syrian protests as with the escalation of the
conflict in Yemen coincided precisely with the international decision to authorize
the use of force in Libya.
48. Neil MacFarquhar, Push in U.N. for Criticism of Syria Is Rejected, N.Y.
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did issue a presidential statement on Syria in August 2011, as the
Libyan conflict entered its final stage.4 9 By late November 2011, the
regime was largely isolated, with the GCC and the Arab League
forging a consensus against Assad and even Turkey turning sharply
against its former ally. A vote condemning the regime garnered over
120 votes in the Third Committee of the United Nations General
Assembly on November 22,50 followed within three months by
condemnation by the Human Rights Council and then an
overwhelming vote of 137 states in a plenary meeting of the General
Assembly against the Assad regime.51
Against this backdrop, the United States, 52 the European Union, 53
and Turkey54 all adopted the posture that "Assad must go."55 In fact,
Turkey now serves as the organizing base for the "Free Syrian Army,"
a growing collection of military defectors taking up arms against the
Assad regime and mounting increasingly effective attacks.56
TIMES (Apr. 27, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/28/world/middleeast/
28nations.html.
49. U.N. SCOR, 66th Sess., 6598th mtg, U.N. Doc. S/PV.6598 (Aug. 3, 2011).
50. Syria: UN Human Rights Committee Condemns Crackdown, BBC (Nov.
22, 2011), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-15834540. The third
committee is the "social, cultural and humanitarian affairs" committee of the
General Assembly.
51. Rick Gladstone, General Assembly Votes to Condemn Syrian Leader, N.Y.
TIMES (Feb. 16, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/17/world/middleeast
/secretary-general-ban-ki-moon-castigates-syria-ahead-of-general-assembly-
vote.html.
52. Khaled Oweis, Obama Says Assad Must Go, Orders New Sanctions,
REUTERS (Aug. 18, 2011), http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/08/18/idNIndia-
58854320110818.
53. U.S., Europe Call for Syrian Leader al-Assad to Step Down, CNN.COM
(Aug. 18, 2011), http://articles.cnn.com/2011-08-18/politics/us.syria-lPresident-
bashar-al-assad-president-assad-syrian-people?_s=PM:POLITICS.
54. Zeina Karam & Suzan Fraser, Recep Tayyip Erdogan: Bashar Al Assad
Must Step Down, HUFFINGTON POST (Nov. 22, 2011), http://www.huffington
post.com/2011/11/22/recep-tayyip-erdogan-bashar-assad_n_1107162.html.
55. INT'L CRISIS GRP., MIDDLE EAST BRIEFING NO. 31, UNCHARTED WATERS:




56. Mona Alami, Syrian Rebels Seek Help Waging Civil War, USA TODAY
http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/story/2011-12-12/syrian-rebels-civil-
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Meanwhile, until he was withdrawn, the American ambassador in
Damascus routinely attended opposition meetings and protests, in
order to offer international protection to demonstrators.5 Unilateral
sanctions against Syria were imposed by the European Union, the
United States, Turkey, and the Arab League. Though Security
Council action was not possible due to Chinese and Russian
opposition (a reflection of their criticisms of the course of the Libyan
intervention),59 these coordinated sanctions were an effective
alternative. The next steps under discussion among Western powers
with respect to Syria focus particularly on intervention through
funneling arms and financial support to Syrian opposition forces, with
or without the authorization of the Security Council.60 In addition,
war/51849650/1 (last updated Dec. 13, 2011).
57. See US Ambassador Robert Ford to Return to Syria, BBC (Dec. 6, 2011),
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-16057041 (noting that Ford "had
angered Syrian authorities by showing solidarity with activists involved in an
uprising against President Bashar al-Assad's rule").
58. Alexandra Zavis & Amro Hassan, Arab League Approves Sanctions
Against Syria, L.A. TIMES (Nov. 28, 2011), http://articles.latimes.com/
201 1/nov/28/world/la-fg-syria-arabs-sanctions-20111128; Alice Fordham, Turkey
Announces Sanctions Against Syria, WASH. POST (Nov. 30, 2011),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middleeast/turkey-unveils-sanctions-on-
syria/2011/11/30/gIQAbgONCO story.html; Aamer Madhani, Treasury Announces
New Sanctions Against Syria, USA TODAY (Dec. 1, 2011),
http://content.usatoday.com/communities/theoval/post/2011/12/treasury-announces-
new-sanctions-against-syria/I; Sarah Kent & Benoit Faucon, EU Sanctions Put a
Chokehold on Syrian Crude Oil Exports, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 13, 2011),
http://online.wsj.com/article/BT-CO-20111213-711160.html.
59. Russia and China Veto UN Resolution Against Syrian Regime, GUARDIAN
(U.K.) (Oct. 4, 2011), http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/oct/05/russia-china-
veto-syria-resolution.
60. Arab League Chief Says Arming Syrian Opposition Might Be an
Alternative, GUARDIAN (U.K.) (Feb. 29, 2012), http://www.guardian.co.uk/
world/video/2012/feb/29/arab-league-syrian-opposition-video; Turkish FM: Ankara
Supports Arming Syria Rebels, EU TIMES (Mar. 4, 2012),
http://www.eutimes.net/2012/03/turkish-fm-ankara-supports-arming-syria-rebels/;
Anne-Marie Slaughter, How to Halt the Butchery in Syria, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 23,
2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/24/opinion/how-to-halt-the-butchery-in-
syria.html. Slaughter, the former director of policy planning for the State
Department under the Obama Administration, argues specifically that "nations like
Turkey, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and Jordan [should] arm the opposition soldiers with
anti-tank, countersniper and portable antiaircraft weapons. Special forces from
countries like Qatar, Turkey and possibly Britain and France could offer tactical and
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referral of the regime to the International Criminal Court for crimes
against humanity is also an option under discussion, drawing on the
model innovated in Libya. The goal of such a referral would be to
lend international legal imprimatur to the mounting external
opposition to the Assad regime, complementing existing support for
the "Syrian National Council" 6 1 and the Free Syrian Army. Indeed,
International Criminal Court referral has been transformed from a
mechanism for criminal accountability for former regime officials to
another lever for regime change and one that, in many ways, is
functionally comparable to the U.S. and E.U. invocation of the R2P
doctrine in the Libyan context.
By February 2012, the debates about Syria in both the Arab
League and the United Nations explicitly focused on regime change.
The Arab League "peace plan" for Syria established the goal of
forming a new national unity government and requiring that Assad
step down, conditions that hardly seemed calculated to elicit regime
cooperation. 62 The draft resolution circulated to the Security Council
expressed full support for the Arab League's goal of replacing the
regime with a national unity government, occasioning Russian and
Chinese vetoes. 63  The eruption of explicit disputes over the
possibility of the Council backing demands for regime change in Syria
may distinguish this case from Libya-largely due to Russian and
Chinese resistance-but they also indicate the degree to which
invocations of humanitarian grounds for intervention and calls for
regime change now coincide. The ratcheting external pressure and
strategic advice to the Free Syrian Army forces. Sending them in is logistically and
politically feasible; some may be there already." Id.
61. For more on the SNC, see Randa Slim, Meet Syria's Opposition, FOREIGN
POL'Y (Nov. 1, 2011), http://mideast.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2011/11/02/
meet-syrias opposition.
62. Kareem Fahim, Arab League Floats Ambitious New Peace Plan for Syria,
N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 22, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/23/ world/middleeast
/arab-league-floats-new-peace-plan-for-syria.html.
63. Neil MacFarquhar, U.N. Tentatively Backs a Plan for Syria, N.Y. TIMES
(Feb. 2, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/03/world/middleeast/diplomats-at-
united-nations-work-on-revisions-to-syria-resolution.html; Paul Harris et al., Syria
Resolution Vetoed by Russia and China at United Nations, GUARDIAN (U.K.) (Feb.
4, 2012), http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/feb/04/assad-obama-resign-un-
resolution.
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covert arms trafficking signal the increasing internationalization of the
Syrian uprising.
Understandably, for protesters relentlessly subjected to brutal
regime repression and massive human rights violations, the shift
towards greater international involvement must seem welcome. Yet
the potential for even greater civilian casualties as a result of
internationalization is extremely dangerous, particularly when
compared to the Libya precedent. In light of the United States' stake
in altering Syrian policies towards Israel, Turkish interests in
containing Syria's Kurdish population, and Saudi aspirations to
challenge Iranian influence, as well as the internal sectarian and ethnic
makeup of Syria, internationalization threatens to push the country
further into a full-blown civil war. Nonetheless, the convergence of
external interests with the desperation of regime dissidents may well
yield a short-term preference for such intervention, particularly in the
form of "indirect" arming of the opposition. Such an approach is
currently the preferred scenario among Western powers and their
regional allies, but may prove an even worse alternative than more
direct external military intervention. This is because even with
additional arms, opposition groups resisting the repressiveness of the
Assad regime will remain outmanned by their state adversary.
Moreover, because much of the opposition is based in cities, there is a
high likelihood that more arms will ratchet up the level of violence in
densely populated urban areas. In other words, additional arms, given
the countervailing military power of the Syrian government, may
ultimately accelerate threats to civilians (such as by intensifying the
regime's already harsh response), while prolonging and deepening the
conflict. One way that this deepening would occur is by accentuating
the sectarian character of internal violence, since the opposition will
be armed by regional sunni actors including those operating in
Turkey, Iraq, and Lebanon. Over the long-term, the costs of
intervention are likely to outweigh any initial benefits by complicating
and postponing political transition while magnifying dangers to the
civilian population.64
64. See, e.g., Rami Al-Shaheibi, Libyan Militia, Army Clash Near Tripoli's
Airport, SALON.COM (Dec. 11, 2011), http://news.salon.com/2011/12/11/
libyan militia army clash near tripolisairport/.
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Where key U.S. allies have faced destabilization as a result of the
democratic demands of their populations, the approach has been to
manage these demands through a combination of concessions, back-
channel negotiations, and outright coercion to bolster the position of
the regime. By contrast, where perceived adversaries face domestic
protests, the approach has been precisely the reverse-statements of
strong support for regime opponents and international pressure for
rapid transformation and regime change (accomplished with the
assistance of sanctions, asset freezes, travel bans, and even military
intervention). Such actions-most obviously in the example of Libya
and increasingly in the case of Syria-are styled as "humanitarian"
and justified on grounds of the threat posed by the existing regime to
the welfare of the civilian population. Yet a comparison with other
regimes in the region suggests that the principal distinguishing feature
of those who face international pressure to step down-rather than
international assistance for managed transition-is their relationship
to a regional distribution of power. Still, as we explore below, the
broader concerns with the politics of interventionism and the realities
of provisional sovereignty do not suggest that it is impossible for
external actors to operate in solidarity with democratic movements on
the ground.
IV. RECLAIMING SOVEREIGNTY AS SELF-DETERMINATION
At the same time as the United States and European Union have
been interceding across the region to protect their strategic interests,
the last year has also witnessed the flourishing of grassroots forms of
transnational cooperation in the Middle East. Such cooperation offers
an alternative to external intervention by modeling a politics of
internationalism grounded in popular solidarity rather than top-down
imposition. More than anything else, this new transnational politics
was spurred by the fact that publics throughout the Arab world
believed themselves they are confronted by the same grievances
(corruption, joblessness, and authoritarianism) and are struggling for
the same aspirations (civil liberties and socio-economic freedoms).
This sense of a common predicament played a critical role in fanning
popular protest from one country to the next and was evident in the
repetition of political slogans, not to mention modes of organizing.
Indeed, many of those involved in local protests explicitly based their
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practices on fellow activists elsewhere and understood their own
activities as part of a wider regional transformation. Through popular
regional cooperation, democratic-social movement actors have
generated resources to resist both local authoritarian practices and
geostrategic alliances that dictate outcomes from above. In the
following pages, we work through what this model of solidaristic
mobilization has encompassed and the promise it holds.
One of the clearest manifestations of regional knowledge transfer
among civil society actors has been evident in the use of social media.
As an example, the April 6th movement in Egypt coordinated broad
strategies in deploying Facebook and Twitter with their counterparts
in Tunisia, while also learning basic tactics-such as measures to help
offset the effects of teargas. In a recent public address, one of the
leaders of the Egyptian Tahrir Square uprising, Ahmed Maher, noted
that these transregional civil society connections were neither arbitrary
nor accidental. 65  Rather, beginning with a meeting in Beirut,
sponsored by the Carnegie Middle East Center, a collection of "illegal
political groups" of the region from Tunisia to Egypt to Syria to
Kuwait started coordinating with one another in building grassroots
civil society movements in each of their respective contexts. Maher
noted that alongside media strategies and protest tactics, broader
shared vocabularies and repertoires of protest grew out of this
coordination. As the chant "ash-shab yurid isqat an-nizam" ("the
people want to overthrow the regime") echoed from capital to capital,
so too did the jokes and colloquialisms of the uprisings. The Tunisian
demand that Ben-Ali "d6gage" was transformed into the Egyptian call
saying irhal; the shared sentiment being that the regimes should leave
now. Egyptians transformed chants from "the people and the army are
one hand" 66 to "the people and the people are one hand"67 and began
issuing revolutionary communiques as a parody of SCAF declarations
by communiqu6. 68 The chants, humor, and poetry of revolution across
65. Ahmed Maher, Lecture: A Special Briefing on the Egyptian Uprising
(Nov. 15, 2011).
66. An early chant that emerged when the Egyptian military refused to fire on
protesters in Tahrir Square in February 2011.
67. A response to the brutal repression undertaken by the military in response
to the second uprising in Tahrir in November 2011.
68. A Communiqud from the Revolutionaries of Tahrir Square, JADALIYYA
(Dec. 4, 2011), http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/3375/a-communiquC3
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the region generated its own form of cultural and linguistic
innovation.69 This transregional coordination eventually transcended
the Middle East, as Tunisian and Egyptian activists joined forces in
meeting with the leaders of the Occupy Wall Street movement in New
York's Zuccotti Park.70
The emergence of bottom-up Arab activism has been deeply
reminiscent of the pan-Arab solidarities that once defined anti-colonial
politics in the Middle East. Although today's Arab activists do not
understand themselves in the classic terms of the Arab nationalism
that emerged in the post-colonial Middle East, they share much in
common with an earlier era of Third World internationalism. Above
all, current social movement activists, like their predecessors, have
drawn inspiration and clear political lessons from the efforts in
neighboring countries, while continuing to act within their own
borders to alter domestic structures of governance and authority.
Further, they have drawn connections between their domestic
grievances and a regional order subordinating local preferences to
international priorities, particularly those of Western powers and their
local clients. Moreover, these social movement activists also see the
success of their own freedom struggles as bound to the success of
other Arab uprisings and to a fundamental regional reordering away
from security imperatives and towards questions of social justice.
This is because by placing pressure on authoritarian regimes
throughout the region, mass movements, even when operating in
political isolation, have nonetheless jointly undermined the symbolic
and material resources available to all the relevant regimes.
Indeed, such transnational solidarity does more than strengthen
the potency of particular, nationally-defined protests. It also offers
perhaps the last, best method of challenging the logic of provisional
sovereignty. By refusing to allow geostrategic alliances to determine
the internal composition and objectives of governing elites, mass
%A9-from-the-revolutionaries-of-tahrir-sq.
69. For instance, this rich new cultural landscape was captured in an edited
volume published by the American University of Cairo Press entitled TRANSLATING
EGYPT's REVOLUTION: THE LANGUAGE OF TAHRIR (Samia Mehrez ed., forthcoming
2012).
70. From the Editor, MIDDLE E. REP., Winter 2011, at 1, available at
http://www.merip.org/mer/mer261/editor?iplogin nocache=549bfd9ab63f3c1 9al
d59894034a93dd.
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movements in states like Egypt are staking a claim to meaningful and
popular sovereignty over economic and political life. To the extent
that such activism takes place against a backdrop of regional protest-
with alliances of dissent emerging across state borders-the power of
external interveners to set the terms of revolutionary change
diminishes. Both intervening states and recalcitrant elites must
accommodate popular practices on the ground and address the internal
grievances that have stoked rebellion.
The fact that these grievances have overwhelmingly centered on
socio-economic concerns provides a final lesson for external actors
seeking to act in meaningful solidarity with local movements. The
primary approach of U.S. foreign policy to the Middle East has been
to privilege its military and security arrangements above all else, and
to determine friends and enemies based on these arrangements. In
order to shore up internally illegitimate but externally valued allies,
the United States has then found itself propping up client states and
intervening on a near continuous basis throughout the region-all in
the elusive search for a durable peace. But the claims of movement
actors on the ground indicate that the best method of actually
producing such stability may have little to do with imposing
geostrategic alliances and far more with the internal capacity of states
to gain actual domestic legitimacy.
In the end, such legitimacy rests on whether there exists what
Alex de Waal has called a "political contract."71 By political contract,
de Waal above all means the capacity for mass movements to
"articulate a new right, and forc[e] a reluctant government to comply
with its claims."72 He argues that such contracts often emerge when
those disenfranchised by ordinary processes are able to intervene and
alter existing structures of authority.73 The key point about a political
contract is that the rights in question are not principally generated by
external interveners or by insulated decision-making bodies. Rather,
citizens-through popular mobilization and sustained political
contestation-compel governments to accept institutional changes and
to re-prioritize basic social needs. In a sense, what we are witnessing
71. ALEX DE WAAL, FAMINE CRIMES: POLITICS AND THE DISASTER RELIEF
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throughout the Middle East is the explicit drive by engaged publics to
construct new political contracts--ones organized in large measure
around goals of civil liberty and economic justice. In contrast to a
U.S. regional order based in provisional sovereignty for local actors,
this indigenously defined political contract is an assertion by local
constituencies of both permanent sovereignty and self-determination,
with these constituencies imposing popular demands on autocratic
elites.
Ultimately, for such contracts to take hold, it is imperative that
justice claims dominate domestic and regional reordering rather than
being made subservient yet again to security arrangements. Above all,
the grassroots mode of politics-emerging throughout the region and
linking shared interests and goals-must be provided the space to
flourish. This mode of politics speaks to a new moment of Arab and
North African solidarity, but can only produce a durable and lasting
political framework if foreign actors refrain from seeing the uprisings
through the prism of geostrategic opportunity and peril. Provided the
necessary space and support, one could imagine the rise in the region
of a pax Arabica, grounded in the actual needs of local citizens. Over
the long run, such an order has the potential to prove far more durable
than the prevailing pax Americana, which at present has only
generated further instability and, not unsurprisingly, enjoys little
popular acceptance.
V. CONCLUSION
Transnational solidarity suggests a radical meaning for
sovereignty. The meaning of such sovereignty is neither provisional
nor parochial, but rather demands that overlapping international
regimes and regional arrangements enable the expression of
indigenous preferences. This conception of sovereignty and solidarity
not only resonates with an earlier moment of post-colonial political
praxis, it also works to recover a specifically Arab political framing
that disappeared as a result of a combination of Cold War rationales,
the Arab-Israeli conflict, and the rise of kleptocracies. The promise of
such a conception would replace the pax Americana associated with
the eclipsing of regional Arab solidarity with a pax Arabica centered
on enfranchised and mobilized publics. Crucially, this new pax
Arabica need not be understood as "anti-American." Instead, it would
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simply take local interests rather than American priorities as a starting
point for regional order.
In repudiating provisional sovereignty, Arab publics have
articulated a set of positive demands that point the way towards a new
ordering. First, they have definitively rejected the privileging of form
over substance that has long characterized the rule-of-law and good-
governance reform projects advocated by external actors intervening
in the region. Understanding that law has served as an instrument of
dictatorship, these publics have defied the strictures of autocratic
legality and demanded meaningful political transformation in the
place of transitions predicated on the institutionalized rules of
electoral authoritarianism. Second, the innovation of vocabularies and
repertoires of transnational solidarity have produced a new idiom
through which Arab publics recognize themselves as agents who are
regionally interconnected. This is not the Arab nationalism of old but
a new actualization of regional solidarity from the bottom up. Finally,
by explicitly privileging social justice above military and security
prerogatives, the Arab uprisings have thrown off the straitjacketing of
their own interests in the name of counterterrorism, anti-Islamism, and
Israeli and Western preferences. No longer an anarchic periphery, but
resituated at the center of its own exercise in self-determination, the
Arab uprisings have challenged most of all the post-colonial order of
authoritarian privilege entrenched through external support.
Even as individual regimes face the chants of protesters in their
main squares, the ordering of the Middle East as a pax Americana,
too, has come under pressure in the last year. That pressure invites us
to consider the ideological continuities between current U.S. and
European engagement with the region and previous eras of imperial
politics. Most importantly, it calls on us to remember how colonial
relationships were formed historically in the Arab world and their
lasting legacies for the present moment. The story of colonialism in
the region is not merely that of the conquest of non-European peoples
and the appropriation and exploitation of their lands and resources.
The extraction of resources and expropriation of peoples was
accompanied by justifications grounded in claims of advancing
modernization, progress, and development. These idioms of external
self-congratulation were designed to overcome the contradictions
between liberalism and imperialism. Those contradictions and the
deployment of justificatory frameworks to reduce the dissonance they
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produce are evident again today as the West and its regional allies
confront the Arab uprisings. Rather than acquiescing in these
vocabularies of orderly transition or interventionist humanitarianism,
we would do well to remember the traditions from which such models
emerge, and embrace, instead, the alternative framings offered by the
public protests underway across the region.
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